McMullen et al. (2009), Journal of Management Studies

Managerial (In)attention to Competitive Threats

This theory paper proposes why middle managers' warnings about emerging rivals can go unheeded: different positions in the firm trigger different motivational focus, which tilts what top managers pay attention to.

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Questions this study helps answer

What the research saysWhy doesn't bad news reach senior leaders?

Related studies

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